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In civilized warfare force is directed against the armed enemy and his 
defensible positions but not against his country and subjects who may 
be morally unconcerned in the hostilities and innocent of offence. But 
this is not civilized warfare; the enemy does not possess troops that 
stand to be attacked, nor defensible posts to be penetrated, robber 
fastnesses to be scaled, and dwellings containing people, all of them to 
a man concerned in hostilities, there is not a single man of them who is 
innocent, who is not, or has not been, engaged in offences, or who does 
not fully support the misconduct of his tribe, who is not a member of 
the armed banditti. The enemy harass the troops as they approach, 
threading the defiles, and leave their village, carrying off everything 
that can be carried, abandoning only immovable property - walls, 
roofs, and crops. What are the troops to do? Are they to spare these 
crops and houses, losing the only opportunity they are ever likely to 
have of inflicting damages on the enemy, marching back to their 
quarters without effecting anything, amidst the contempt of the 
hillmen? …To spare these villages would be as unreasonable as to 
spare the commissariat supplies or arsenals of a civilised enemy.   
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Between 1849 and 1914, imperial troops undertook more than 60 expeditions against 
the tribes of the North-West Frontier.2 Partly because of their inability to pacify the 
region, the specificities of frontier warfare occupied officers, officials and 
commentators throughout the colonial period. As Temple’s account makes clear, 
frontier combat was regarded as distinctive: the ecology of the frontier region, and the 
supposed truculence of the tribal populations who lived there, were thought to require 
particular strategic and tactical adaptations. By 1914, a host of publications had 
emerged offering histories of, and instruction in, frontier conflict: the Governments of 
Punjab and India issued increasingly sprawling official histories in 1873, 1874 and 
1907, while a variety of compendium volumes were published either side of 1900, 
including Charles Callwell’s oft-cited Small Wars in 1896, and H.C. Wylly’s From 
the Black Mountain to Waziristan in 1912.3 Following Wylly, this chapter examines 
colonial engagements on the Black Mountain, and in Waziristan, during the late 
nineteenth century. The chapter offers a cultural reading of colonial campaigning, 
arguing that combat on the frontier was shaped, in important ways, by a cultural 
exchange: strategic, tactical and logistical calculations reflected ideas and 
assumptions about the frontier, its population and their relationship to colonial 
power.4 By tracing the development of specific rationalities for frontier conflict 
through a series of deployments, the chapter reveals the intersection of colonial 
culture and imperial military power, confirming Nicholas Thomas’s assertion that 
colonial violence was always ‘mediated and enframed by structures of meaning’.5 
 The dialogue between colonial culture and operational practice is most clearly 
signalled in the conspicuously performative logic of frontier campaigning.6 According 
to Callwell, the ‘great principle’ for fighting small wars was ‘that of overawing the 
enemy by bold initiative and resolute action, whether on the battlefield or as part of 
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the general plan of campaign’.7 Boldness and vigour were the essential qualities for 
colonial soldiers facing ‘savages and guerillas’ for, as Callwell explained in his 
analysis of an expedition against the Chitralis in 1895, ‘moral force is even more 
potent than physical force in compassing their downfall’.8 Frontier expeditions were 
thus conceived and executed as performances which sought to instantiate colonial 
authority through the penetration and occupation of tribal territory. Situating colonial 
culture and colonial combat in the same analytic field, allows us to explore more 
effectively how military praxis was shaped by overlapping and mutually reinforcing 
ideas about tribal opponents and colonial authority.9 In short, it helps us to see how 
culture shaped not only the attitudes of colonial soldiers, but also how it informed 
their strategic and tactical decision-making. Reading colonial expeditions as cultural 
projects also allows us to better understand the limits of colonial military power on 
the frontier. While most frontier operations provided few direct engagements with 
enemy forces, emphasizing the ‘moral’ effects of colonial interventions obscured the 
inability of colonial troops to force decisive engagements with tribal opponents. As 
Temple made clear in 1856, the penetration of ‘rough hills’ and destruction of crops 
and houses, were typically the only means of punishing ‘savage’ enemies. The 
cultural rationale for these actions helped to empower colonial officers to do 
something and so to disguise their inability to effect decisive encounters with tribal 
opponents. The rhetorical emphasis on the supposed ‘truculence’ of the frontier tribes, 
which was codified in a corpus of colonial ethnography, reflected the same limits on 
colonial authority; essentialising discourses of Pathan fanaticism served to obscure 
the failure of colonial schemes to settle the frontier.10 
 Situating the history of frontier conflict in these contexts helps us to better 
understand the role of the military in representing empire in the metropolis, not least 
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because this approach illustrates how the instrumentalist concerns of the imperial 
military are sedimented in the colonial archive.11 Colonial accounts of frontier 
warfare – such as those offered by Temple, Callwell and Wylly – were deeply 
implicated in attempts to secure imperial authority. H.C. Wylly conceived From the 
Black Mountain to Waziristan to address a specific weakness of colonial (military) 
knowledge: to provide a single volume to impart to British officers knowledge of both 
the ‘wild men’ they could expect to encounter on the frontier and the ‘equally wild 
country in which operations were to be conducted’.12 The instrumentalist genealogy 
of colonial counter-insurgency is overlooked in much of the historiography: though 
there is a considerable literature on the North-West Frontier, there are few detailed, 
scholarly analyses of nineteenth century frontier conflicts.13 Much of the extant work 
traces the emergence of a doctrine of frontier warfare to the turn of the twentieth 
century, a periodization which reflects the slew of publications which emerged in the 
aftermath of the protracted, and expensive, operations of 1897-98.14 This framing 
overlooks the way in which twentieth century texts drew on existing ideas and 
practices: Wylly’s text, like Callwell’s, articulated the specificity of frontier warfare 
in ways that built directly on the cultural readings provided by Temple and others in 
the previous century. Thus, while a doctrine of frontier warfare was codified only 
around the turn of the century, the genealogy of ‘savage warfare’ can be traced 
through various forms, from at least the 1850s.15 To explore this genealogy, and its 
relationship with colonial military praxis, let us follow Wylly, first to the Black 
Mountain, and then to Waziristan. 
  
*** 
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Lying in the Hazara district, on the very edge of imperial territory, the ‘Black 
Mountain’ comprised a series of peaks rising from a ridge punctuated by deep 
intervening glens. The inhabitants of the region – mostly Hassanzai, Akazai and 
Chagarzai Pathans– were regarded as impoverished and largely insignificant, if 
occasionally troublesome.16 Between 1852 and 1892, five ‘punitive’ expeditions were 
dispatched against the Black Mountain tribes. On each occasion, imperial troops 
confronted the ecology of the frontier as well as the tribesmen who resided there: as 
Wylly’s preface makes clear, colonial understandings of ‘wild men’ and ‘equally wild 
country’ were mutually reinforcing. As we will see, military commanders frequently 
equated subduing the country with subduing the population.  
 The first punitive expedition against the Black Mountain tribes was prompted 
by an incident in 1851 in which Hassanzai tribesmen killed two customs officials 
undertaking (unauthorized) survey work near the border. The principal objective of 
the campaign, which began in 1852, was to drive tribal forces from the crest of the 
Black Mountain, a region which was, in effect, a shared (or contested) dominion.17To 
seize the ridge, the expeditionary force was disaggregated, and three columns 
advanced independently with the objective of clearing and occupying the mountain’s 
heights. This show of force was duly achieved, while other regular troops were left in 
reserve ‘to make demonstrations’ on surrounding positions.18 Operations continued 
until early January, by which point a host of Hassanzai villages had been destroyed 
and up to twenty tribesmen killed.19 The campaign was deemed a success, and 
colonial troops were withdrawn. In his report on the operations, Lieutenant-Colonel F. 
Mackeson, the Commanding Officer, remarked that: ‘the fact of the highest summits 
of the Black Mountain having, when clad with snow, been climbed by British and 
Kashmir troops in the face of all the opposition that its mountain defenders, prepared 
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and resolute to oppose them, could bring them against them, needed no 
amplification.’20 
While there few direct encounters with tribal forces, Mackeson’s summary 
suggests there was a significant performative element in the operations: occupying the 
crest, demonstrating on surrounding peaks and destroying ‘hostile’ villages were 
calculated attempts to project colonial force against the tribes and the ecology of the 
mountain itself. The colonial sources suggest that tribal responses frequently worked 
in a similar register: the tribesmen made a conspicuous show of confronting the 
expeditionary troops, ‘waving flags and flourishing sabres’ and following up colonial 
forces as they withdrew. Though colonial accounts of the expedition emphasized the 
range and effect of the operations, the transient nature of the occupation and the 
inevitability of a very public retreat, clearly afforded those who opposed the 
expedition space for alternative readings of the engagement. Indeed, the ability of 
tribesmen to challenge performances of colonial power – by ‘following up’ 
withdrawals and publicly contesting imperial dominion – was a frequent cause of 
concern for commanders and commentators.21 
 The 1852 expedition did little to ‘pacify’ the Hazara frontier; the Black 
Mountain tribes were implicated in disturbances throughout the 1850s and the 1860s. 
In 1868, a large body of tribesmen attacked a police post in the Agror Valley, 
prompting the dispatch of a second, and more substantial, expedition. As in 1852, the 
operations reflected an explicitly performative logic: the force disaggregated, and 
columns were dispatched to assert dominion over the Black Mountain.22 Wilde, 
commanding, believed that the ascent of the mountain – ‘where no roads existed… 
through dense forest, and over slopes broken up by huge masses of rock’ – had 
surprised the tribes. Having secured the ridge, pioneering and reconnaissance 
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operations were pushed forward and troops then destroyed a number of Pariari Syad 
villages. According to Wilde, colonial mobility, allied to the use of mountain artillery, 
apparently for the first time, had contributed to the ‘overawing’ of the tribesmen.23 
When tribal representatives submitted to colonial terms, F.R. Pollock, the 
Commissioner, compelled senior tribesmen to accompany colonial troops on a march 
through tribal territory– ‘in a token of submission, and as hostages for their good 
behaviour during our march’.24 The penetration and occupation of tribal territory was 
invested with specific cultural significance: Pollock reported that this was ‘called, in 
oriental phraseology, “lifting up their purdahs”, explaining that ‘the aims and objects 
of Government were fully attained when our troops, at a slight sacrifice of human life, 
established themselves on the most commanding position in the enemy’s country.’25 
As Pollock made clear, particular understandings of tribal culture shaped both the 
nature of the operations and the measures by which their success was weighed. 
Following a similar rationale, the Government of India was optimistic about the 
operations and their likely effects, concluding they would ‘doubtless convince the 
border tribes that they cannot inflict annoyance on our frontiers without rendering 
themselves liable to punishment, despite the almost inaccessible situation of their 
villages’.26 While the material effects of the expedition may have been ‘limited’, the 
Governor General reported that ‘the exhibition of our ability to penetrate into the 
heart of their country and to inflict chastisement, if rendered necessary, has produced 
considerable effect and tends to a subsequent respect of our power and of our 
territories’.27 
 In fact, the Hazara frontier was ‘disturbed’ through the 1870s and 1880s and a 
third expedition was dispatched following an attack on a colonial survey party in 1888 
that left two British officers and four sepoys dead.28 Though it transpired that the 
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party was conducting unauthorized reconnaissance in contravention of standing 
orders, the attack confirmed the sense that the Hazara frontier was beyond control. 
Colonial outrage was compounded by the stripping of the bodies, and further by a 
series of ‘threatening demonstrations’ adjacent to the colonial frontier. Confirming the 
performative and dialogic nature of the frontier encounter, one officer concluded: ‘no 
doubt the tribes have flattered themselves that we were frightened off by these 
demonstrations, and in consequence are more than usually pugnacious and 
contemptuous’.29 The disturbances forced a reevaluation of the once-lauded 1868 
expedition: the Government of India reported that the effects of the 1868 campaign 
had proved ‘very transitory’, while the Government of Punjab concluded that ‘the 
expedition [of 1868] failed to convince the tribes of the strength of the British 
government and encouraged them in their belief in the accessibility of their villages to 
a punitive force’.30 JamesLyall, the Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab, concluded that 
that there was no prospect of settlement ‘until military action had proved to the Khan 
Khel Hassanzais and the Akazais that their country was not beyond our reach, and 
that we had the power to punish them’.31 The Punjab Government reported that ‘the 
prestige of the British government on the Hazara border had sunk to a dangerously 
low ebb’.32 These re-readings make clear, once again, how frontier conflicts were 
framed in cultural terms.  
 The 1888 expedition was one of the largest punitive expeditions of the 
nineteenth century, involving nearly 10,000 troops. Operating in four columns, the 
force began coordinated advance into tribal territory on 4 October. The expedition 
lasted for a little over one month, in which time there was only one significant 
engagement– at the village of Kotkai on 4 October, where Hassanzai tribesmen and a 
group of the so-called ‘Hindustani fanatics’ opposed the initial advance of the fourth 
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column.33 Colonial troops deployed Gatling Machine Guns to good effect, halting 
advancing swordsmen before they could reach British positions.34 Mountain artillery 
cleared tribesmen from fortified positions before the village, while a further assault, 
supported by artillery and machine guns, captured the village itself.35 Enemy dead 
were estimated at more than 200, while just five colonial troops were killed. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the engagement on 4 October was the only occasion on which 
tribesmen and their allies sought to engage colonial troops at close quarters. 
Thereafter, the Black Mountain lashkars (tribal war bands) offered very little direct 
resistance: there were some reports of sporadic guerrilla activity but the despatches 
record only one other hostile action by the tribesmen. 
 Unable to force further engagements with the tribes, the expeditionary forces 
manifested the colonial presence in other ways. Road building operations were 
pushed forward to create a material infrastructure which would, according to the 
Adjutant-General, ‘impress the tribes… with a sense of their insecurity against a 
hostile visit, should they offend again’.36 Requisitioning of crops and fodder, and the 
signal destruction of settlements, compounded the disciplinary penetration of tribal 
territory. Villages were selected for signal destruction for a variety of reasons: 
sometimes because their inhabitants were suspected of being involved in specific acts 
of hostility (recent or long passed), sometimes simply because of their putatively 
‘inaccessible location.’ Thus, mountain artillery was increasingly used to attack 
villages at greater distances: General W. Galbraith, commanding the Second Brigade, 
wrote to the Quarter-Master General, to report that the bombardment of the hitherto-
unvisited Kand villages had immediate ‘good effect, inhabitants clearing out with 
goods and cattle’.37 In lieu of direct engagements with tribal forces, these kinds of 
spectacular operations were conducted with the intention of ‘proving’ the ability of 
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colonial troops to penetrate tribal territory. Thus, Garhi, a Parari stronghold at which 
tribal forces had gathered in strength and with standards, and Kopra, thought to be the 
‘most inaccessible of the Parari villages’, were ‘selected for destruction in order to 
show the tribe that we had the power of moving anywhere in their country’.38 To 
underscore this point, the Government of India then approved a march on Thakot – 
the most northerly of the Parari villages – and a location hitherto unvisited by colonial 
troops. In fact, a column of troops had been dispatched to Thakot in 1868, but the 
advance had been abandoned, giving ‘the inhabitants an exaggerated idea of the 
security of their position, which it was now necessary to correct’.39 The Governor of 
the Punjab wrote that the advance on Thakot was intended ‘as a demonstration and to 
exact satisfaction’.40 Despite precipitous terrain on the approach to the village, a 
mixed force of imperial troops reached Thakot, unopposed, on 28 October. The 
village was spared, save for a promenade through the village by imperial troops, 
accompanied by the pipes of the Seaforth Highlanders playing ‘You’re o’er lang in 
coming, lads’. The symbolic and performative registers of frontier conflict could 
hardly be clearer.41 
 After their conclusion, Punjab Government reported to the Government of 
India that the 1888 expedition had been successful: ‘it has been demonstrated to these 
tribes once and for all that their country can be traversed by British forces… the 
whole of the Hazara border has been thoroughly cowed’. In summing up the effects of 
the operations, the Secretary to the Government of Punjab reported ‘that the effects of 
the Expedition have been far reaching and are likely to last in the same way as the 
effects of the Expedition of 1868 have lasted, but with exactly the contrary tendency, 
the Lieutenant-Governor feels no doubt. All along the Peshawar border the effect has 
been great […] and there is no doubt that the effect will extend to Kohat…’42 
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Anticipating ‘the fear inspired along the border by our operations’, the Deputy 
Commissioner at Peshawar speculated that ‘no doubt the account of the ease with 
which we worked over this rugged country, our improved weapons, telegraphic and 
heliographic appliances and other arrangements has spread far and wide’.43 The 
optimism was, once again, misplaced: when colonial troops set out to ‘prove’ their 
authority by marching along the crest of the Black Mountain in autumn 1890, large 
numbers of tribesmen gathered in the now-familiar ‘threatening demonstrations’. 
After snipers fired on imperial troops, the promenade was abandoned. Even the 
abandoning of the march, however, was weighed in performative terms: McQueen, 
commanding, was reluctant to retreat under fire and thus commenced his retreat 
having first ascended a spur in the mountain’s foothills, a strategic sleight of hand he 
hoped would disabuse the tribesmen of any notion that imperial troops had been 
forced into retreat.44 
 Thus, yet another expedition was sanctioned in and in March 1891 a colonial 
force once again marched against the tribes of the Black Mountain. The pattern of 
operations was repeated: despite many ‘threatening demonstrations’ tribesmen 
refused opportunities to engage colonial troops leaving the ‘Hindustani fanatics’ to 
provide the only close-quarters resistance.45 While the expedition was declared 
successful, troops were in action on the Black Mountain again the following year and 
the region remained disturbed throughout the rest of the decade. While operations 
were intended to ‘make a show’ of colonial authority –confirming, once again, the 
spectacular and performative nature of colonial frontier warfare – the pattern of 
engagement on the Black Mountain highlights the limits of colonial military power. 
While Callwell praised the ‘great moral effect’ of operations in the region, the fact 
that none of the five expeditions dispatched to the region seem not to have delivered 
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the much-anticipated ‘pacification’ suggests there was significant scope for 
alternative ‘readings’ of the encounter.46 
 
*** 
At the other end of the North-West Frontier, a similar pattern of engagement unfolded 
in Waziristan, where five punitive expeditions were undertaken between 1849 and 
1902.The Waziristan frontier extended for more than 100 miles, from the Gomal Pass 
in the south to the fertile valleys and peaks of Tochi in the north. The official and 
semi-official histories of Waziristan present a familiar narrative of raiding and tribal 
truculence.47According to Wylly, the Waziris were ‘an especially democratic, and 
independent people… even their own mullahs have little real control over them’.48 
The Mahsuds, who occupied the centre of Waziristan, were said to boast that ‘the 
armies of kings had never penetrated their strongholds’.49 The Mahsuds confirmed 
their reputation as notorious robbers by launching a series of substantial raids on 
colonial territory in the decades after annexation, most notably in 1860 when a 3,000-
strongMahsudforce raided the town of Tank in the Derajat. According to colonial 
commentators, the raid on Tank demonstrated that the Mahsuds were ‘emboldened by 
years of immunity, and [by a belief] that they could successfully oppose any attempt 
to penetrate their mountains’.50 
 As a corrective to tribal assumptions about territorial inviolability, and in 
punishment for the raid on Tank, the Government of India ordered a punitive 
expedition against the Mahsuds in 1861. As on the Black Mountain, the cultural 
frameworks that mediated colonial relationships with the frontier and its population 
informed tactical assessments and operational planning. It was anticipated, for 
example, that the tribesmen would make a stand and oppose a colonial advance in 
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order to ‘avoid the shame’ which, it was thought, a colonial ingression into tribal 
territory would imply. In the event, no such resistance was offered, and tribal forces 
chose to engage the expedition only sporadically, at times of their own choosing and 
in locations better suited to their own capabilities. So, having offered little resistance 
against the advance of colonial forces, on the night of 22 April tribesmen made a 
determined attack on the expedition’s principal camp at Palosi, killing 63 and 
wounding 166 colonial troops.  Though Wylly conceded that the assault was carried 
out with great gallantry and determination, he elided the logic of Mahsud strategy by 
explaining that the raid was carried out ‘in the true Afghan style – dashing, but ill-
judged and ultimately failing for want of support and assistance’.51 Similar, orientalist 
ideas informed colonial engagements with the tribe throughout: in a calculated show 
of colonial paternalism, tribesmen were invited to collect the bodies of their dead 
following an early skirmish.52 The offer aimed ‘to mitigate, as far as possible, the 
bitterness of hostilities’ and though the Mahsuds did not send for the bodies, it 
suggests the way in which forms of cultural knowledge – real or imagined – were 
mobilized in attempts to signify the nature of colonial authority (and its putative 
benevolence).  
 Culture appears to have mediated the military encounter for belligerents on 
both sides of the frontier: when a group of Mahsud maliks(tribal headmen) arrived to 
negotiate terms with a view to settlement, they were solicited to pay a large fine and 
provide hostages for good behaviour or to submit to the unopposed march of colonial 
troops through their territory, a condition which, as we have seen, was also imposed 
on the Black Mountain.53 According to the Intelligence Branch’s history, the maliks 
pleaded that ‘we should allow them some pardah (or screen for their honour), 
meaning that we should spare them the disgrace of submission, or of having an army 
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march into the country’. In answer to this, ‘it was fairly objected that we also required 
some pardah; an army had marched into the country to demand reparation for years 
of unprovoked injury and trustworthy security for the time to come…’54 Whether 
authentic or not, cultural knowledge provided an idiom through which the colonial 
encounter on the frontier was negotiated. While the penetration and occupation of 
tribal territory may have been invested with symbolic significance this was often part 
of a consciously negotiated strategy pursued by both colonial officers and tribal 
representatives. When the maliks refused to submit to the terms proposed, colonial 
troops struck out for the outlying settlement at Kaniguram, a site specifically selected 
to demonstrate the range of the imperial military. After reaching Kanigoram on 5 
May, the troops performed ‘an orderly march’ through the town. According to the 
official history, one of the town’s inhabitants called out ‘Well done! British justice!’ 
Though Kanigoram was spared the bagpipes, the promenade reflects the same 
performative logics demonstrated in the march on Thakot in 1888. In attempting to 
make colonial authority intelligible, and then to render tribal subordination in visible 
and public forms, colonial officers sought to weaponize understandings of tribal 
culture to constitute their authority in specific and meaningful ways. As the example 
above suggests, the tribesmen too negotiated resistance to colonial authority in 
cultural, as well as in military, forms.  
 That frontier campaigns operated in a cultural register should not detract from 
the very significant material destruction effected by colonial troops; rather, material 
and cultural effects overlapped and reinforced each other. Hunger was an important 
weapon in fighting uncivilised enemies, as Temple’s early account of ‘savage 
warfare’ made clear.55 While Kaniguram was spared on payment of a fine, Makin, a 
neighbouring town, was destroyed, as were other surrounding settlements. In 
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accounting for these measures, Chamberlain, the commanding officer, cited the 
peculiar imperatives of ‘savage warfare’, quoting extensively from Temple’s 1856 
report.56 Overlooking the fact that the expedition had failed to extract submission 
from the Mahsuds, colonial accounts emphasized the ‘remarkable fact’ that: ‘a 
comparatively small British force did successfully enter a most difficult mountain 
country, and there, though cut off from all supplies, all communications, did 
successfully punish the enemy, drive them from their strongest passes, and return, 
with comparatively little loss, to its own territory.’57 
In positioning territorial and material performance as the measure of the 
expedition’s success, these accounts obscured colonialinability to establish military 
superiority over the tribesmen. The supposed peculiarities of tribal culture thus 
provided a convenient means of effacing the obvious limits on colonial military 
power. 
 Notwithstanding Chamberlain’s optimism, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
1860 expedition appears to have had limited impact on the Waziristan frontier.In 
1879, another large raid on Tank compelled the Government of India to revisit their 
assessment of the 1860 expedition. The earlier optimism gave way to a more 
pessimistic conclusion: that ‘the Mahsuds’ stubborn and haughty refusal to make 
formal submission’ in 1860 reflected the tribe’s view that colonial troops were unable 
to penetrate ‘their fastnesses’ or ‘force the rugged defiles leading to their homes’.58 
Another expedition was ordered and when colonial troops returned to Waziristan in 
1881, they set out to prove their ability to penetrate and occupy trans-frontier 
territory: the commanding officer was instructed to ‘traverse and explore as much of 
the Mahsud hills as possible… your operations should be deliberate and free from all 
appearance of haste’.59 As we have already seen, this framing anticipated the inability 
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of colonial troops to force decisive engagements against the tribes. As in 1860, there 
were few direct encounters between the expeditionary forces and the Mahsuds again 
chose to avoid prolonged engagements. In lieu of such engagements, colonial troops 
set about the symbolic and epistemological opening of the frontier, occupying 
outlying villages and undertaking extensive surveying operations. In fact, in the 
absence of direct encounters with the enemy, one of the measures by which the 
expedition’s success was calculated was the scale of survey work undertaken: 
according to the Punjab Government’s Military Secretary, ‘much new country has 
been unveiled’.60 Military surveying served overlapping purposes, at once practical 
and symbolic: cartography inscribed the penetration of tribal territory in the colonial 
archive and aided the planning and preparation of future operations.61 As on the Black 
Mountain, the epistemological opening of the frontier was directly equated with the 
symbolic ‘lifting of the purdah’ which the operations aimed to effect. In summarizing 
the lessons of the operations, The Pioneer opined that:  
 
There is no measure which tends to the ultimate pacification of our 
frontier more thoroughly than the occupation by our troops of the 
remoter portions of the country inhabited by tribes who defy our 
authority. For it is only by such means that the conviction can be 
forced upon them that no strongholds which they possess are 
inaccessible to our arms. The course, which they themselves rather 
graphically describe as “lifting the purdah” of the tribe or section 
concerned, is essential to the permanent success of our military 
expeditions;…62 
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While surveying was a mechanism for ‘opening out’ the frontier – often with 
significant practical consequences – such operations were typically pursued only in 
the absence of opportunities to engage tribal lashkars. Thus, if frontier operations 
were often about ‘unveiling’ tribal territory, this was principally because colonial 
forces had no effective mechanism for forcing a decisive engagement. While 
cartography was often marshaled to evidence the range of colonial power – 
particularly by commanders and officers anxious to represent and quanitfy the fruits 
of their labour – it is worth noting that, before the 1881 expedition commenced, the 
Government of India explicitly reminded Kennedy, the commander of the 1881 
expedition, that surveying was not one of the objectives of the operations, an 
instruction they subsequently repeated to Brigadier General Gordon during the 
expedition.63 Whatever symbolic and practical effects military surveying bestowed, 
cartographic conquests assumed prominence only when decisive military 
engagements proved illusive. 
 The 1881 operations lasted a little under a month. When colonial troops 
withdrew, no submission had been received from the tribes and none of the principal 
conditions for settlement had been met. Despite this, the colonial archive records 
significant optimism about the effects of the expedition. The official report was 
laudatory and the Lieutenant-Governor anticipated that the punishment inflicted 
would ‘secure for a long time to come the peace and quiet on this part of our north-
western border’: ‘To the whole Waziri nation from Kuram to the limits of 
Baluchistan, has been held up the spectacle of a tribe, numbered amongst the proudest 
and most powerful, compelled to permit a British army to traverse unopposed the 
length and breadth of its country, while from the summit of Prighal and the heights of 
  206 
the Shuedar surveyors mapped and explored valleys and mountains hitherto regarded 
as asylums inaccessible to invasion.’64 
 Reprocessing the official narrative, H.L. Nevill underlined the same point, 
diverting attention from the palpable failure of the operations – at least in terms of the 
narrow military criterion established at their outset – by emphasizing the cartographic 
and symbolic successes of the operations: ‘Much valuable survey work was 
accomplished during these operations, the purdah had been effectually lifted and the 
tribesmen overawed’, though he acknowledged, that ‘the absence of any decisive 
military success somewhat discounted the value of these results’.65 
 The results were indeed discounted: despite the optimism recorded at the 
conclusion of the expedition, hostilities with the Waziris resumed in 1894, when a 
colonial force working to delimit the ‘Durand Line’ was attacked at Wana. The attack, 
which killed 45 colonial troops, prompted yet another expedition to be dispatched into 
Mahsud territory.66 Like most of its predecessors, the Waziristan Field Force of 1895 
encountered little direct resistance.67 Evelyn Howell, British Resident in Waziristan in 
the 1920s, reported that, ‘as in 1881 there was little or no fighting’.68 In the absence 
other engagements, the Field Force targeted valleys which ‘had never been visited by 
our troops, and were looked on as the strongholds of the Mahsud tribe’.69 While the 
‘visit’ of colonial troops meant significant material losses in property and crops, the 
strategic significance of these operations was explained in cultural terms: ‘the fact of 
our having lifted their “pardah” in these remote glens will doubtless itself have a good 
effect on the tribe’.70 When operations were brought to a close in March, the 
expedition was said to have been ‘absolutely successful’. According to the official 
history: ‘All sections of the Mahsud tribe concerned in the attack on the British camp 
at Wana were severely punished… From the map, which accompanies this history, it 
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will be seen that Waziristan was traversed from one end to the other, and that our 
troops penetrated into the remotest glens of the Mahsud country, and lifted the 
“purdah”, from the enemy’s most inaccessible strongholds.’71 
 If the spectacular nature of these operations is clear, it should be noted that, as 
in previous campaigns, the performance of imperial dominion in these terms – 
through signal destruction, promenading and survey operations – was a response to 
the Mahsuds’calculated decision not to oppose the advance of colonial troops. While 
the absence of tribal resistance was sometimes taken as evidence of submission or 
deference, other readings are possible. The casualty lists from the 1894 operations 
indicate that while only four colonial soldiers were killed by enemy action, fully 171 
died of pneumonia before the operations were wound down. If these data help us to 
understand why ecology was so central to colonial visions of frontier conflict, they 
may also help us to better understand the strategic calculations which guided tribal 
responses to colonial incursions. Retreat, obfuscation and delay served tribal ends by 
exploiting the epistemological and logisitical weaknesses of the imperial military:  
exposing their relative lack of mobility, straining parlous supply lines and 
confounding the temporal discipline of colonial interventions. These actions were not 
the product of inalienable tribal culture or of cowardice; they reflected calculated and 
rationale choices which can be understood as such.  
 From this perspective, we may also better understand the pattern of colonial 
engagements on the frontier. Despite the confidence recorded as the 1895 expedition 
was wound up – and in spite of a body of troops remaining in the Tochi Valley – the 
Waziristan frontier remained disturbed.72 A further punitive expedition was 
undertaken in the Tochi in 1897-98, and Mahsuds continued to confound colonial 
authority through 1898 and 1899. A further round of operations was commenced in 
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1900 and yet another expedition was undertaken in 1901-1902. In spite of all the 
operations and despite the optimism recorded in the colonial archive, the pacification 
of the Waziristan frontier seemed as distant in 1900 as it had in the 1850s. In 1912, 
Wylly concluded, glumly, that despite the efforts of the previous half century, the 
Mahsuds remained ‘almost as turbulent as ever’.73 
 
*** 
Colonial engagements on the Black Mountain and in Waziristan share a number of 
common features. Indeed, it was precisely to elucidate these features that officers, 
officials and subsequently historians began to assemble the first synthetic analyses of 
frontier campaigns. As we have seen, the imperial military played a central role in 
constituting colonial power on the North-West Frontier, though this process was 
always contested, as the patterns of military engagement surveyed here suggest. 
Contrary to claims made in many of the colonial sources, resistance to colonial 
expansion prompted expeditions more often than wanton raiding did: attacks on 
police posts and survey parties suggest calculated resistance, not unthinking 
fanaticism. Moreover, despite the confident assertions of finality offered by 
commanders, military interventions were seldom decisive: the operations in 1860 and 
1881 failed to secure submission from the Mahsuds, and the settlements reached on 
the Black Mountain in 1888 and 1891 were broken months after they were agreed. 
The iterative nature of frontier campaigning suggests the importance of the military to 
the process of colonial consolidation but also the limits on imperial military power. 
The ability of commanding officers to effect decisive encounters with tribal 
opponents was seriously prescribed, most importantly by the ability of tribal 
antagonists to deflect, evade and contest colonial violence. The tactical and strategic 
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calculations of tribal opponents – in playing for time, in attacking camps and baggage 
operations in the rear, in retreating before colonial advances – imposed significant 
limits on colonial military power on the frontier.74 
 Faced with these limits, and with other resistance, colonial campaigns on the 
frontier developed wider and alternative means for ‘punishing’ tribal enemies. These 
included the destruction of crops and property, as well as the penetration and 
occupation of tribal territory. These acts were increasingly understood as a form of 
punitive cultural transgression equated with the symbolic ‘lifting of the purdah’. 
Considered more ‘modern, and certainly more effectual’ than the ‘burn and scuttle’ 
approach favoured earlier in the century, these methods were equally contingent on 
specific understandings of tribal culture: while Chamberlain asserted in 1860 that 
‘savages cannot be met and checked by the rule of civilizd warfare’ so subsequent 
attempts to ‘lift the purdah’ appropriated a notion of tribal honour as a means of 
constituting tribal punishment. Of course, as we have seen, these rationales also 
disguised the inability of the imperial military to compel their opponents to engage. 
The cultural framing of frontier conflict reflects this reality as much as it does the 
weaponizing of tribal culture. In this sense, the history of colonial frontier campaigns 
tells us more about colonial visions of self than it does about the tribes against whom 
operations were directed. The opening up of frontier territory, and the gendering of 
colonial dominion suggested by the purdah metaphor, drew on a series of wider 
oppositions which were fundamental to colonial rule. The performative logic of 
frontier campaigning – distilled by Callwell into a chapter on ‘boldness and vigour’ – 
reflects the instrumentalism of these oppositions.75 
In ‘lifting the veil’ from the tribes, and the frontier itself, military technologies 
acquired specific cultural resonances which directly shaped the ways in which 
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operations were organized and evaluated. Culture was central not only to the 
representation of combat on the frontier but also to the ways in which that military 
engagements were planned and executed. By facilitating the performance of colonial 
military power, survey and pioneering operations helped to inscribe the colonial 
presence on the frontier, and also to render the frontier as a presence in the colonial 
archive. Military technologies thus intersected with, and gave material form to, the 
cultural frames through which engagements were mediated. As we have seen, 
pioneering, mapping and communications were conceived as explicitly political 
technologies because their operational significance was accentuated and understood 
in terms of the particular cultural effects associated with the penetration of tribal 
territory. If military technologies helped commanders to ‘over-run’ and ‘open up’ the 
frontier’s contested spaces, this was in large part because the pacification of the 
frontier was conceived in cultural terms.76 Though the relationship between military 
technology and colonial expansion has been much studied, less attention has been 
paid to the cultural frameworks which informed attitudes towards, as well as 
deployments of, military technologies.77 While military technologies could provide 
potent means for expressing the range and effect of colonial power, colonial culture 
shaped the ways in which military power was imagined and projected.78 One 
consequence of the cultural rendering of frontier campaigns was to obscure the 
limited effects of military interventions and disguise the obvious limits of colonial 
power on the frontier.  
Historians have found it difficult to conceptualize the relationship between 
culture and combat on the frontier partly, perhaps, because the instrumentalism of the 
colonial sources is widely overlooked. If much military historiography evinces 
a‘preference for the empirical’, empiricist readings of the colonial archive inevitably 
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recycle colonial framings, offering what Gyan Pandey called, in another context, ‘a 
view of the observable’.79 Thus, even detailed and careful reconstructions of the 
colonial conflicts, reproduce much of the essentialism found in colonial sources.80 As 
the sources surveyed here make clear, colonial accounts of the frontier, and of the 
military engagements which occurred there, were invariably implicated in and thus 
shaped by colonial power. Empiricist readings of colonial sources reproduce this 
complicity. More importantly, perhaps, they disguise the reciprocal and dynamic 
cultural exchange which is inherent to combat, and is perhaps especially significant in 
colonial conflict.81 
 A more critical approach to the colonial archive, and its absences, helps to 
reveal the central role of culture in shaping colonial military policy on the frontier. 
The absence of a formal, codified doctrine for ‘hill warfare’ does not mean that the 
specificities of frontier conflict were marginal or insignificant during the late 
nineteenth century. Narrowly empiricist readings of frontier doctrine – which begin 
with the formalization and codification of instruction around the turn of the century – 
overlook the wider histories on which these doctrines drew, and the deeply-rooted 
assumptions which helped to sustain them. As the examples above attest, and as 
Callwell himself admitted, Small Wars gave concrete and didactic form to practice 
which had existed – and indeed had been written about – for many years.82 Though 
the doctrine of savage warfare was of relatively late development, warfare on the 
frontier always reflected the cultural frameworks through which the colonial 
encounter was rendered, mediated and understood. This was not simply about 
justifying violence through an assertion of the otherness of the colonized, it was also 
about manifesting violence in forms which reflected the alterity of tribal belligerents. 
Viewed from this perspective, we can better understand the dialogic role that culture 
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played in framing and delimiting colonial military operations on the frontier. Frontier 
operations both reflected, and helped to give particular form to, a cultural idiom 
which mediated engagements between colonial forces and their tribal opponents. The 
highly symbolic and performative aspects of these operations were expressed in 
strategic and tactical planning, as well as in the discourses used to narrate and 
rationalize campaigns. Framing frontier warfare in this manner helps us to see how 
culture and military praxis intersected, and to appreciate how frequently the latter was 
made legible in terms of the former. Here again, cultural and military analyses need to 
be engaged on the same analytic field: we need to recognize the cultural referents that 
mediate conflict in order to reveal the centrality of the military in the production of 
complex imperial subjectivities. 
 Specific notions of ‘tribal culture’ were vital in shaping how colonial 
campaigns were conducted, and in determining how such interventions were 
evaluated and historicized. Tribal culture was invoked to explain the circumstances 
which precipitated military intervention, the forms of intervention most appropriate to 
secure colonial ends as well as to account for the effects, and more rarely the failures, 
of colonial operations. Military engagements on the colonial frontier reflect the 
negotiated and contested process of imperial expansion. Violence was central to this 
process and so too was culture, for culture shaped both the institutions and apparatus 




Understanding the connections between culture and combat on the frontier seem all 
the more urgent in light of renewed interest in the region since 2001.83 Indicatively, 
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the return of western troops has prompted a resurgence of interest in colonial 
‘counter-insurgency’, including a number of attempts to recuperate the ‘strategic 
insights’ of colonial doctrine, notably Callwell’s prescriptions for fighting ‘small 
wars’.  
Somewhat paradoxically, re-readings of Callwell have emphasized the 
importance of winning ‘hearts and minds’ by the ‘judicious’ application of ‘butcher 
and bolt’ operations.84 The cultural knowledge which helped Callwell to explain the 
history of colonial violence, and to offer prescriptions on how such violence might be 
organized in the future, were themselves products of colonialism.85 Attempts to 
recuperate Callwell reflect a double, and circular, failure of analysis: ignoring the 
specific historical conditions in which Small Wars was authored obscures the 
contingency of Callwell’s strategic thinking and the structural racism of his text.86 
This reading reproduces colonial binaries, locating reason in the colonial military 
archive, while fixing and ventriloquizing culture as the marker of tribal difference. 
Little wonder then that so much work on colonial conflict continues to reproduce the 
tropes, and explanations offered by colonial authors. These accounts fundamentally 
misunderstand the role of culture in mediating – and shaping – the worldviews of both 
colonial and tribal belligerents. As this essay has tried to show, culture shaped the 
ideas and practices of colonial soldiers at least as much as it did their tribal opponents. 
Colonial ethnography bestowed culture on the frontier tribes as a way of 
depoliticising their resistance, and recent attempts to harness colonial expertize 
recirculate precisely the same oppositions. The persistence of these oppositions and 
the ways of thinking they sustain confirm Gayatri Spivak’s suggestion that the texts of 
‘soldiers and administrators’ did much to construct the reality of India.87 As we 
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continue to live with this construction, and the violence which it begets, this truth 
behoves us to do more to understand it. 
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